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single regime, but in fact it was subject to separate Austrian and Hungarian
regulations. From the Iron Gates to Braila, the map would make it appear as
if one regime existed, while in fact Serbia and Bulgaria had each independent
control of a share of the southern, Roumania of the northern, bank, the treaty
of 1883 never having been put into effect. 'It was undoubtedly an error of
printing that the Iron Gates-Cararact section was not extended into Serbia,
beyond the Roumanian boundary, to cover the whole improved reach of the
river. The map of the Congo basin indicating the railway around the fords and
rapids to Stanley Pool and other breaks of navigation on the river system is a
most useful addition to the work.
JOSEPH P. CH
New York, N. Y., February xxth, 1919
The Position of Foreign Corporations in American Constitutiondl Law. By
Gerard C. Henderson. Cambridge, Harvard University Press. igi. pp. i99.
This is a most stimulating contribution to the literature of what has long been
a nebulous branch of constitutional law. Few departments of the law exhibit
more clearly the flexibility of the constitution, its adaptability to changing
economic conditions and the resulting difficulty of forecasting constitutional
decisions, than that of foreign corporations. But the greatest factor contributing
to uncertainty and anomaly in this branch of the law has been the unfortunate
confusion in the theory of the corporation. Curiously enough, by piling fiction
upon fiction, some measure of justice has now been worked out by treating the
corporation as a "person!' or a "person within the jurisdiction" under the Four-
teenth Amendment. Not even yet have the Supreme Court and the legal world
generally accepted the view that incorporation is merely a device, a form or
method adopted by real human beings for doing business and enjoying their
property, just as a partnership is. The author clearly perceives the inaccuracy
of the "fiction" and of the "real" theory of a corporation, into which we have
been led principally by continental jurists. But his praiseworthy attempt to
explain away the confusion (p. i65 ff.) would have derived much assistance from
the able contribution to that end already made by the late Professor Hohfeld in
(igog) 9 CoLUmmBA L Rnv., particularly at pp. 288-291. It is to be doubted
whether "modern jurisprudence" has "generally rejected" the theory that "only
persons can be subjects of rights and duties." (p. i65). On the contrary, it
seems to the reviewer that recognition of that fact shows the superfluity of the
"fiction" and "real" theory and enables the corporation to be seen as a mere
device covering the transactions of a group of individuals.
The author has devoted himself primarily to the task of tracing the evolution
of our constitutional law of foreign corporations from the restrictive ruli of
Taney's dicta in Bank of Augusta v. Earle (1839) to the liberal rule of almost
compulsory recognition sanctioned in the Pullman and Western Union Cases
against the State of Kansas (ixgio). The task has been performed with marked
ability. Not only is his critical analysis of the decisions themselves a meritorious
service, but his discussion of the economic background of the decisions throws
much light upon the motives consciously or unconsciously actuating the court.
Taney's refusal, because of the jealousies and provincial interests of agrarian
communities, to extend the protection of the comity clause to corporations or to
recognize their inherent p;ivilege to exist and do business outside the state which
created them, has impressed our constitutional law until very recent times. The
resulting power to exclude, and therefore to admit on conditions, was finally
driven to such an extreme application by Kansas in taxing the entire capital stock
HeinOnline  -- 28 Yale L.J. 523 1918-1919
524 YALE LAW JOURNAL
of the Western Union and the Pullman Company (216 U. S.) that the Supreme
Court was impelled.to break down its logic and invoke the "due process" clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to save foreign corporations from extortionate condi-
tions of admission. Holmes' dissenting opinion in the Western Union case
attests his deference to logic and the virility of Taney's views, as fortified by
such cases as Paul v. Virginia. But as the Western Union and Pullman cases
also involved the commerce clause it can hardly be said that the court has fully
sustained the author's view that the state no longer has an unlimited power to
exclude foreign corporations from an independent local business. Possibly they
will some time take that position, but in Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts
(1913) 231 U. S. 68, 34 Sup. Ct. 15, they had not yet reached it; and in the two
very recent cases of Looney v. Crane Co. (1917) 245 U. S. 178, 38 Sup. Ct. 85, and
International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts (igi8) 246 U. S. 135, 38 Sup. Ct 292,
decided since Mr. Henderson's book went to press, ,the commerce and due
process clauses jointly afforded protection against the state statute. What would
have been the result had there been no assistance derived from the commerce
clause is not certain. Again the restrictive principle has been greatly weakened
by the so-called doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, which grew out of the
attempt of various states to penalize" or expel foreign corporations for the
removal of suits from the state to the federal courts. Some sophistry is
necessary to sustain the distinction between the exaction of an agreement not to
remove, which was held unconstitutional, and the expulsion for actual removal
without advance agreement, which has been sustained. Possibly Donald v.
Philadelphia and Reading Coal Co. (igz6) 241 U. S. 329, 36 Sup. Ct 563,
although also involving interstate commerce, justifies the view that all attempts
to prevent or punish the privilege of removal will be enjoined as unconstitutional.
To the vexed problem of the "citizenship of a corporation" (Chap. IV) the
author has made a useful contribution; our constitutional law in this matter has
had little help from the voluminous continental literature on the subject.
Arminjon (p. i88) was a Frenchman, not a Spaniard, although his monograph
was translated for the Spanish Treaty Claims Commission. One of the best
among the several excellent chapters in the book is Chapter X entitled "A
critical re-examination" in which the author exhibits that understanding of tha
underlying economic conditions in a growing industrial country without which
our constitutional law becomes a disconnected series of judicial reactions to
unrelated facts. The work has decidedly enriched our legal literature and
deserves hearty welcome from a profession but poorly endowed with scholarly
contributions.
EDWIN M. BORCHARD.
YALE UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL.
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